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Power, Habitus, and National Character: The 
Figurational Dynamics of Brexit 
Michael Dunning & Jason Hughes ∗ 
Abstract: »Macht, Habitus und Nationalcharakter: Die Figurations-Dynamik des 
Brexits«. Most explanations that have sought to understand the “causes” of 
Brexit have tended to focus on the idea of a “left-behind” white working class 
who were exercising a protest against a liberal elite. Other approaches have cit-
ed the roles played by a broader demographic in Britain, or have identified 
“cleavages” between “nationalist” and “cosmopolitan” normative codes. Howev-
er, such approaches typically fail to address the complexities of longer-term 
social processes which have been fundamental to Brexit. The analytical models 
used to explain these cleavages have tended to conceptualise the relationships 
between the two codes as irreconcilable opposites, rather than as shifting bal-
ances in the context of changing social conditions. In this paper, we focus upon 
understanding Brexit as part of a set of longer-term developments in human 
figurations involving moves towards greater integration with concurrent coun-
tervailing disintegrative pressures. These shifting patterns of integration and 
disintegration involve changes of habitus, balances of power (such as function-
al democratisation), and expanding and retracting spans of emotional identifi-
cation. The relationship these processes have to early nation-state formation in 
Europe are critical, exposing how the dualisms in national codes have been 
fundamental to the formation of national identities since the Renaissance.  Our 
central argument is developments in these areas of human interdependence 
have contributed to recent centripetal shifts towards more nationalistic norma-
tive codes, and the resulting cleavages being witnessed in Europe, the United 
States, and indeed, across the world. We explore these shifting relational dy-
namics and show how a longer-term developmental approach helps to move 
the debate beyond present-centred and static considerations.    
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1. Introduction: English Public Opinion 
During a lecture given in 1960 in Germany on the national peculiarities of 
British public opinion, the sociologist Norbert Elias contended that in trying to 
develop a unified European state, one of the biggest obstacles faced was that 
each nation involved had a highly developed sense of national identity (Elias 
2008, 230). That some progress towards integration had been made was due in 
part to the severely shaken sense of national pride among the countries on the 
European mainland. He was, of course, referring to the damage to national 
pride incurred during and after the Second World War, and how its weakening 
contributed to a post-war period characterised by less fractious international 
relations. For Elias, however, the British were a peculiar and special case. He 
argued that, unlike other of the key European nations of the time, the British 
had emerged from the Second World War with their sense of national pride still 
intact; even the longer-term demise of the British Empire had left this relatively 
unshaken. This, he suggested, was reflected in how the British viewed the rest 
of Europe:  
In the national consciousness of the mass of the British people, the members 
of most continental European nations stand out as aliens whose differentness 
is tolerated patiently, but with whom one hardly identifies in terms of feelings. 
There are familiar turns of phrase in contemporary English which give expres-
sion to the feeling that the term “Europe” relates only to the European main-
land, and that Britain itself lies outside Europe. Such self-evident truths of the 
national consciousness have a powerful influence on public opinion, and 
therefore on political decisions which depend on public opinion. (Elias 2008, 
232-3) 
Elias was talking about how, in a period prior to the UK joining the then pre-
cursor to the European Union, the European Economic Community (EEC), the 
British regarded themselves as distinct from the peoples of mainland Europe, 
and that this belief had major influence on political decisions. Of particular 
note here is Elias’ observation that the British found difficulties in identifying 
with other Europeans “in terms of feelings”: a fundamentally affective disjunc-
ture. British national pride, he suggested, remained relatively “unbroken” and 
“more insular and self-isolating than ever” relative to the shaken national pride 
of other large European states. He noted that “rational arguments” in editorials 
by newspapers like the Financial Times were in favour of joining the EEC. 
But, he suggested, the public outside of “progressive circles” were not ready to 
join. Instead, Elias proposed, Britain’s emotional attachments were to the Eng-
lish speaking world – countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and 
the United States, plus the newer English speaking nations of Africa – rather 
than Europe. With public opinion aligned in this way, Elias suggested, the 
British government would not go against the tide of such an “emotive wind of 
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public opinion,” and it would be a considerable time before the UK joined the 
EEC.  
In making these observations, Elias adopted the analytical footing of an an-
thropologist observing an ethnographically separate group – he did so as a 
Jewish émigré scholar who was in the process of becoming established within 
British society, a kind of partly-established outsider. His observations bear 
testament to a time during which English or British public opinion about Eu-
rope was just as divided, possibly more divided, than it is in the present day. 
The debates during that period are noteworthy for their remarkable similarity to 
the more recent debates before and after the UK’s vote to leave the European 
Union in 2016. Of course, Elias was wrong to suggest that a considerable 
amount of time would likely need to pass before the UK joined the EEC (the 
UK initially applied for membership in 1961 and finally joined in 1973), but he 
was only partially wrong. He was, as we shall argue, correct in identifying the 
existence of an enduring fault-line in British identity and habitus between, on 
the one hand, a we-ideal fixed on national greatness and pride, and on the oth-
er, emotional identification at broader levels – the European level, and indeed, 
at the level of humanity as a whole. 
Elias’s conviction that the UK would not join the EEC was demonstrative 
not only of the opposition to such integration at the time of his writing, but 
upon principles of his more general “figurational” sociological approach – 
according to which we might understand the UK’s vote to leave the European 
Union, or Brexit, as part of a longer-term pattern, one symptomatic of a growth 
in disintegrative pressures and a strengthening of national identities in both the 
UK and other parts of the world. Accordingly, accounts that seek to explain 
Brexit, plus the more general rise in nationalist sentiment in the UK and else-
where – including the election of Donald Trump in the US – through recourse 
principally to relatively recent developments, typically those of the past few 
decades, underplay the role of longer-term processes. In tandem with this ten-
dency, such accounts encourage a simplified politicisation of analyses, through 
a focus on, say, specific neoliberal policies, a supposed abandonment of the 
white working class by all sides of the political spectrum, and so forth. Alt-
hough such explanations have some utility, and are not necessarily “wrong,” 
they tend to provide only a partial explanation for Brexit and the ascendancy of 
nationalist sentiment. At the same time, such accounts, help to reinforce the 
political values of those claiming these explanations as correct.  
This paper seeks to add to our understanding of the Brexit vote and rise in 
nationalism by focusing on the longer-term processes that have played a part in 
these developments. Our aim is to expand understandings of Brexit and the 
growth of nationalism beyond predominantly present-centred analyses. We 
examine some of the social conditions that have contributed to certain groups 
in the United Kingdom, Europe, the United States, and elsewhere rejecting 
processes of integration on both the inter- and intra-state planes. Centrally, we 
HSR 45 (2020) 1  │  265 
explore processes whereby certain groups have lost status or feel their status is 
threatened as part of wider processes of global integration and “functional 
democratisation.”  
Building on the analyses developed by Elias (2013, 162–3), plus his more 
general sociological approach, we show that the conditions for such splits were 
in place as part of the early structural dynamics that contributed to the for-
mation of Western European nation states. During this earlier phase, particular-
ly throughout the 18th  and 19th centuries, dualisms and tensions associated 
with nationalist and egalitarian codes fomented and have in different ways 
remained integral to the national habitus of various “Western” nations ever 
since. We propose that problems of habitus, integration, and interdependence 
are central to the long-term processes of which the Brexit vote and the recent 
re-ascendancy of nationalist sentiment in Britain and certain other Western 
nations form part. Following the work of Elias, we present an analysis that 
anchors such issues within longer-term processes involving a nexus of func-
tional democratisation, emancipation processes, and dualistic normative codes 
in Europe and the United States. 
1.1 Immigration, the Left-Behind, a Cultural Backlash, and a 
Retreat to the Present 
A key motif in recent political and sociological accounts of the vote for Brexit 
and the rise of nationalist/populist sentiments is the idea of a neglected “white 
working class” who have come to feel “left behind” by political elites. Winlow, 
Hall, and Treadwell (2017, 204), as a key example, draw attention to the eco-
nomic insecurity and social position of this group as being pivotal to Brexit. 
They suggest that the Leave vote among this section of the UK population was 
rooted in feelings of being neglected by a liberal elite, feeling that the Labour 
party no longer represented their interests, and sharing a common perception 
that 45 years of membership of the European Union had done little to further 
their interests. For Winlow et al., the last few decades of neoliberal economic 
policies, globalisation, and growing economic insecurity have generated social 
conditions which, for members of the white working class, have engendered 
feelings of “loss”: of the security associated with paid work, eroded through 
declining job opportunities; and of status, particularly in the context of endemic 
low-pay and widespread experience of precarious employment practices (such 
as zero hours contracts). However, both these senses of loss, consistent with an 
enduring sentiment in British popular discourse, are typically associated by 
members of the white working class with patterns of immigration – themselves 
widely understood to be compounded by the UK’s membership of the EU – a 
sentiment that has been actively fostered by pro-Leave campaigners and the 
populist right more generally. Crucially, Winlow et al. suggest, it is precisely 
through the neglect of the white working class, the erosion of their traditional 
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cultural life, the demise of class-based politics, and in particular the neglect of 
their interests in leftist politics that the fertile ground of right-wing populism 
has been permitted to flourish.  
Similar arguments concerning the relationship between the loss of status 
among the white working class, their sense of betrayal and neglect by the tradi-
tional left, and their backlash against multiculturalism generally, and Islam 
specifically, are advanced inter alia by writers such as Ware (2008), Kenney 
(2012), Lone and Silvery (2014), Mackenzie (2016), and Pilkington (2016). To 
these we could add numerous others, including, for example, Gidron and Hall 
(2017), who analyse how the loss of status of low skilled labour had, somewhat 
paradoxically, become compounded by greater equality for women, eroding the 
sense of masculine sources of esteem and value that were associated with tradi-
tional manual work. Beyond the UK, there are parallels in this respect with 
Fukuyama’s (2018) arguments about the perceived abandonment of the white 
working class in the US generating a “vacuum” that has been filled by right-
wing populism. And, here echoing Gidron and Hall, such arguments chime 
with Hartman’s (2015) observations regarding the “culture wars” in the US in 
which progressive and emancipatory movements of the past few decades – 
feminism, civil rights, gay rights, environmentalism, and so forth – have come 
to be seen as a “force for ill” through their purported erosion of traditional 
(white/heterosexual/male) sources of identity and status. Taken together, such 
analyses coalesce around a focus upon the interrelationship between changing 
socio-economic conditions, a demise of traditional sources of working class 
status and esteem, and the sense of abandonment by the political “establish-
ment” that has come to be understood to have been synonymous with middle-
class liberal intellectuals, all of which, it is proposed, has fostered a swing 
towards anti-immigration and a more general ascendancy of xenophobic and 
nationalist sentiments among members of the white working class. 
While the decline in social status related to the economic position of the 
white working class is no doubt of significance in trying to understand the 
processes that have contributed to the Brexit vote in the UK and the rise in 
nationalism more generally in the West, there is a danger in according too 
much significance to this singular determinant. The danger stems in part from a 
more general tendency towards the relegation of culture, ideas, knowledge, and 
so forth as secondary to the primacy of political economics. It is specious to 
view “class” and “economic change” as primary “factors” which “determine” 
certain kinds of social “outcome”; problematic to do so since such modes of 
analysis ultimately lead towards conceiving of areas of human existence, facets 
of society, that are ontologically separate, albeit that they interact billiard-ball 
style at certain key historical “moments.” Elias’s approach, by contrast, sees 
such “factors” as interdependent aspects of a “figuration”: a diachronic gestalt 
of social processes that cannot meaningfully be separated. At the most basic 
level, human groups can no more survive without knowledge than they can 
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survive without food or protection from physical violence (Elias 2009, 113). 
Accordingly, we might include, but also look beyond, the economic, political, 
and cultural decline of certain groups within society to understand the Brexit 
vote and more general growth of nationalism. In some of his key theoretical-
empirical work (see, in particular, On the Process of Civilisation [2012], Stud-
ies on the Germans [2013], and The Court Society [2005]), Elias centrally 
explored the role played by shifting national codes and ideologies – themselves 
irreducible to political-economic processes – which developed in tandem with a 
series of more general inter- and intra-state processes. Elias is able to show that 
while the values, ideals, symbols, and ideas that come to express the self-
consciousness of particular groups typically lack a high degree of reality con-
gruence, they nonetheless are centrally formative to group identities and mean-
ing, particularly under social conditions that engender threats, both real and 
imagined, to the loss of status of those groups. 
In the case of the debates and political discourses mobilised before and after 
the UK’s vote for Brexit, this sense of loss – of a group whose status is being 
threatened, whose once proud and glorious past is under attack – is indeed a 
particularly important theme. Ford and Goodwin (2014) (see also Goodwin and 
Heath 2016), for example, have shown how calls for the UK’s independence 
from the EU, notably manifest in the rise of the hard-right populist UK Inde-
pendence Party (UKIP) found support, typically among older
1
, poorer, and 
poorly education white work class voters who were: 
more inclined to believe in an ethnic conception of British national identity, 
defined by birth and ancestry, and who have vivid memories of a country that 
once stood independent and proudly apart from Europe […] today these voters 
look out at a fundamentally different Britain: ethnically and culturally diverse; 
cosmopolitan; integrated into a transnational, European political network; and 
dominated by a university-educated and more prosperous middle class that 
holds a radically different set of values, all of which is embraced and celebrat-
ed by those who rule over them. (2014, 270) 
Of particular importance, in this respect, is Ford and Goodwin’s observation 
that the perceived threat posed by European integration was not understood 
simply as a threat to working class interests, but as a threat to Britishness – to 
all that once made Britain special, great, distinctive, in a word, better than the 
rest of Europe. Indeed, the EU came to be mobilised as a symbol for all that has 
eroded traditional British identity and with it all that has fostered the conditions 
for “rampant” immigration (Ford and Goodwin 2014; Goodwin and Milazzo 
                                                             
1
  The widespread idea, highlighted by Ford and Goodwin above, that there is generational 
division between “Leavers” and “Remainers” in the UK could be a fruitful line of enquiry if 
framed within a context of generational established–outsider figurations. Unfortunately, 
there is not space in this paper to develop this argument further, suffice to say such inter-
generational relations are likely to be closely related to some of the processes to be dis-
cussed, including functional democratisation and dualistic normative codes. 
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2017). As Ford and Goodwin acknowledge, such sentiments are by no means 
confined to economically disadvantaged working glass groups. Middle class 
social conservatives are another key section of UKIP’s support. In fact, some 
research suggests that the white working class demographic comprises only a 
part of the Leave vote. For example, Dorling (2016, 354), has suggested 59% 
of Leave voters were middle class (see also Becker, Fetzer, and Novy, 2017). 
Similarly, Swales (2016, 2) and Eatwell and Goodwin (2018, 21) together 
present us with a more nuanced and complex picture of “typical” Leave voters: 
i) affluent Eurosceptics, ii) the older working class, and iii) a smaller group of 
economically disadvantaged, anti-immigration voters.  
Evidently, then, the “left behind working class” thesis, at best, can only par-
tially account for some of the support for the Brexit vote and resurgence of 
nationalism. Indeed, such ideas have been significantly contested by a range of 
social commentators. For example, Bhambra (2017) has argued that the “left-
behind” assumption of Leave voters fails to take into account how members of 
ethnic minorities tend to be among those who have fared the worst economical-
ly in Britain yet a majority of whom voted to Remain. Central to her argument 
is that the “category of class” has come to be used in an increasingly “racial-
ised” sense to refer to the so-called “white working class,” and so the argument 
that the Leave vote was simply that of the “left-behind” is at least in part spuri-
ous. Citing research by Arnorssson and Zoega (2016) who have focused on the 
perception of immigration as central to the Brexit vote, Bhambra suggests that 
opposition to immigration by those who voted Leave was influenced more by 
cultural differences than by economic disadvantage, and that both white work-
ing and middle class groups played a pivotal role in the UK’s vote to leave the 
EU.  
Such “cultural differences” – differences in orientation, differences in values 
– indeed appear to be at the core of a divide that elides reduction to standard 
logics of social distribution based around class, ethnicity, and even traditional 
forms of politics. Here, we might envisage a primary axial tension between 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism, and at that, different imaginaries of British 
“nationalism.” For instance, Calhoun (2016) has suggested that Brexit was an 
English nationalist vote against London, globalisation, and multiculturalism, as 
much as it was against Europe. He suggests that the Brexit vote was an “ex-
pressive” vote of frustration, rage, resentment, and insult, and at the same time 
one of hope that a proud national identity could be saved (2017, 58). He points 
out that a cosmopolitan British national identity emerged during the 1990s, one 
encapsulated by New Labour and the idea of “Cool Britannia.” The rise in 
nationalism is, says Calhoun, a reaction against this form of cosmopolitan 
identity that, it was felt, failed to include those who did not share in the benefits 
of the 1990s economic boom. This view is shared by Crouch (2017, 105) who 
suggests a major cleavage has opened up in British society between those who 
subscribe to a relatively new cosmopolitanism on the one hand and an exclu-
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sive findings from the British Social Attitudes survey serve to demonstrate, 
fewer and fewer Britons see fit to describe themselves as “British”: a term 
which implies a common source of nationality for citizens of England, Scot-
land, Wales, and Northern Ireland – a tendency lampooned in the popular cul-
tural notion of “Little Britain” (2007, 7-8).  
Another, more “figurational” model of nationalism, stresses the overlapping, 
inter-meshing, inter-relating complexities engendered by belonging to multiple 
groups simultaneously. In the former, “restrictive” model of nationalism the 
tensions between being, say, British and European are oppositional – akin to 
competing sides of a divide; they are inherently conflictual, perhaps even polar 
opposites; they are irreconcilable. Conversely, the more “expansive” “cosmo-
politan” version of nationalism stresses the interdependence and inter-
relationship between different spans of emotional identification, between dif-
ferent identities, different “we” images – the impossibility of, for instance, 
ontologically separating “Britain” from Europe in anything other than a notion-
al, discursive sense given the inevitable fundamental inter-dependence between 
Britain and other parts of Europe, indeed global society, in all domains: wheth-
er economic, cultural, or political.
2
  
Such cleavages and divides are themselves compounded by a political cli-
mate that has fostered a focus on the polarisation of imagery, viewpoints, nor-
mative codes, involving divides such as: either Britain or Europe; either Leave 
or Remain; either pro- or anti-immigration; and so forth. In such a climate, 
proponents of either “side” of an increasingly polarised axis have developed 
                                                             
2
  There are, however, limitations to this comparison. A frequent misunderstanding of Elias’s 
model of figurations of interdependent Homines aperti is that it implies groups of humans 
who are mutually dependent in a harmonious, egalitarian manner. Indeed, similar connota-
tions are expressed by the term “cosmopolitanism.” Elias’s terms “interdependence” and “in-
terdependency chains” actually refers to power balances, ratios – asymmetries that develop 
and change over time and rarely imply harmonious or perfectly equal balances. These terms 
are intended to orientate thinking towards the relational character of power, and of how 
through their interlacing, human relationships form a kind of “tissue” that has “its” (though 
it is problematic to think of them as an “it”) own immanent and emergent dynamics that 
cannot be reduced to any of the single individuals or relationships that comprise it. Another 
limitation is rather more obvious, to the extent that we can demarcate political and geo-
graphical territories in a formal sense – e.g., where there are lines on a map, or areas of po-
litical jurisdiction demarcated by law – we can of course think of separations that, while 
they are often contested, and they shift and are redrawn over time, endure sufficiently to 
be “real in their consequences.” The danger, of course, is to treat such formal boundaries, 
territories, borders, and distributions as somehow the direct empirical correlates of the 
“borders” to human interdependencies, nexuses of social relationships, “figurations” to use 
Elias’s term. Whether or not Britain is a member of the European Union, it remains, none-
theless, economically, socially, politically, etc. interdependent with “Europe,” or perhaps bet-
ter, part of a “European” nexus of social figurations, albeit that its power chances and ratios 
within this figurational nexus will likely have been significantly altered after the Brexit pro-
cess has run its full course. 
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collective fantasies of the other. Such fantasies follow the classical contours of 
what Elias elsewhere has described as the blame and praise gossip (or group 
charisma and group disgrace) of established-outsider figurations (Elias and 
Scotson 2008). On the one hand is depicted a group of uneducated, unenlight-
ened, anti-immigration nationalists who have succumbed to a wave of nostalgia 
based on an entirely manufactured version of British history perpetuated by a 
self-serving elite group who have intentionally stoked up such sentiments in 
traditional and digital media. On the other is a putative group of predominantly 
middle class liberals who are only looking out for themselves, and who have 
been duped by the media into believing a fear-mongering discourse – that Brit-
ain will collapse once it leaves the EU – perpetuated by powerful economic 
interests so as to prevent the country from taking back control of its own affairs 
and borders: a situation in which those powerful interests will finally lose their 
hold over the levers of power.  
Some accounts of Brexit, and of the resurgence of nationalism by extension 
or association, have suggested that this tendency towards polarisation is peculi-
ar to these specific historical episodes: a tendency that has been fostered by the 
“echo chamber” of social media where double-bind figurations are formed 
between proponents and opponents who, inadvertently, become mutually sup-
porting and sustaining engines of information and disinformation, accusations 
and refutations, claims and counter-claims that spiral onwards through a seem-
ingly endless feedback loop (see Sunstein 2002; Abramowitz and Saunders 
2008; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Indeed, an analysis of how new media, 
particularly against the backdrop of recent waves of global migration, have in 
some ways mediated the character of debates about Brexit, nationalism, and the 
US presidency (as key cases in point), is no doubt of considerable value to 
understanding some aspects of these developments.  
However, notwithstanding such forms and sources of influence, there is an-
other possibility: namely that this tendency towards polarisation is itself rooted 
in the dualistic character of normative codes. This is not to suggest that such 
codes are indeed, factually speaking, inevitably irreconcilable, but rather, that 
acute tensions between different sets of normative codes are perceived and 
experienced under particular social conditions that serve to exacerbate them; 
these conditions characteristically pivot on specific figurations of emotion and 
national habitus. As suggested above, such conditions include those in which 
certain members of social groups – in this case those that align to particular 
nations or localities – come to fear that the values, symbols, and more general 
way of life that they have come to see as theirs are under threat whether this is 
partly as a consequence of social, economic, or cultural change or warfare 
threatened by, say, economic insecurity, a perception, whether real or imag-
ined. Under such conditions, a historically recurrent tendency is for some, but 
by no means all, members of such groups to “retreat” to narrower spans of 
emotional identification and, ultimately, to a focus on primary “survival units” 
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– a centripetal slide, so to speak, to the perceived inner rings of the normative 
dartboard. Such examples run counter to a much longer-term trend towards 
widening spheres of emotional identification in which the anchors of group 
identity have, at a very general level, moved from smaller to larger survival 
units (see De Swaan’s [1995] discussion of widening circles of identification 
and later [1997] follow-up on dis-identification. See also, for example, Men-
nell’s [1993] account of the Yugoslavian conflict of the early 1990s as another 
counter-example).  
As such, this tendency towards a polarisation in debates, particularly those 
centring on the real or imagined sense of threat to a particular way of life with 
all the values and sources of group identification and status that go with it, is 
not a specific peculiarity of recent debates about Brexit, nationalism, and so 
forth but is common to historical episodes of a particular character, and is root-
ed in a much longer-term set of social processes. In order, then, to properly 
account for such developments it is necessary to consider such processes in 
some detail. Here, again, the work of Elias is particularly instructive. 
2. Problems of Habitus, Integration, and Interdependence 
According to Elias, members of social groups share through their common 
associations and embodied social learning, to a greater or lesser extent, particu-
lar characteristics, orientations, mannerisms, values, and normative standards – 
a kind of “second nature” – which finds expression in certain aspects of per-
sonality, dress, mannerisms, language, and so forth. In relation to the members 
of national groups, such commonalities are sometimes referred to as “national 
character.” While there are particular issues with this term, not least the idea 
that there are sufficient stable and enduring commonalities between people of 
nation states to make meaningful generalisations in this respect, such character-
istics, or better, such aspects of national group habitus are frequently invoked 
(both consciously and unconsciously) as anchors of identity. In as much as 
people regard themselves as French, American, Canadian, British, Chinese, 
Moroccan, and so on, they invoke a particular kind of association, a “we-
image,” to use Elias’s term, that inevitably stands in (a stronger or weaker) 
relation to an “I-image.” Elias suggests such “we” and “I” images are in a kind 
of “balance” that shifts and develops in particular ways and intermeshes with 
the “we-images” drawn from the sense of belonging to other social groups 
(e.g., neighbourhoods, demographic groups, subcultural groups, and so forth). 
The degree to which “we-images” drawn from the nation are prominent and 
significant varies from society to society, over time within any particular socie-
ty, and under different social conditions. As Elias proposes:  
In less differentiated societies, such as the Stone Age hunter-gatherer groups, 
the social habitus may have had a single layer. In more complex societies it 
HSR 45 (2020) 1  │  274 
has many layers. Someone may, for example, have the peculiarities of a Liv-
erpool-English or a Black Forest-German European. It depends on the number 
of interlocking planes in his [or her] society how many layers are interwoven 
in the social habitus of a person. Among them, a particular layer usually has 
special prominence. It is the layer characteristic of membership of a particular 
social survival group, for example, a tribe or state [...] in the German Federal 
Republic or the Netherlands or France, despite strong countervailing move-
ments, the regional differences between people are fading in relation to na-
tional ones as integration advances. (Elias, 2010, 164)  
It is these “strong countervailing movements” mentioned by Elias that appear 
to be central to Britain’s vote to leave the EU and the growth in nationalist 
sentiment in many other parts of the world. These movements appear to have 
slowed down processes of integration at the supranational level, including the 
nascent development of a “mass European identity” (see Hermann, Risse, and 
Brewer 2004; Bruter 2005; Fligstein 2008). But what has contributed to this 
shift (or partial shift) is a much more complex question to answer. Accordingly, 
key to this problem is the dynamism and variability of people’s interdepend-
ence. Chains of interdependence, as Elias points out, manifest as all kinds of 
disparate functions. As part of these chains, people identify themselves as 
members of particular we-groups and as individuals within those we-groups – 
the degree of prominence to the “we” or the “I” is dependent in part on the 
sociogenetic conditions of any particular society. For example, as suggested 
above, in most Western societies the self-consciousness of individuals corre-
sponds to a homo clausus or dartboard model of being, with the self-experience 
of multiple, overlapping but by no means equipotent sources of emotional 
identification. These sources of “we” always stand in tensile balance with a 
sense of “I,” such we-I balances fluctuate within the lifetime of any particular 
individual, and in tandem with more general social developments. It is the 
complex inter-relationship of we-identities and I-identities as part of integration 
and disintegration processes at the national, supra-national and global levels 
that are central to the dynamics of Brexit and the growing prominence of na-
tionalism across the world. That is, whether people identify more with a partic-
ular group, the nation state, some supranational entitle such as the EU, or in-
deed humanity as a whole, is dependent on the particular configuration of their 
interdependence with each other, and the extent to which they are able to derive 
meaning and status as part of the specific constraints of these interdependen-
cies.
3
 
                                                             
3
  It is important to note that when we talk of interdependence we are not referring to the 
way the concept was initially conceptualised by Durkheim. Dunning and Sheard (2005, 237) 
suggest that Durkheim’s understanding of interdependence was utopian because it only 
considered bonds of interdependence, under conditions of organic solidarity, as harmonious 
and cooperative. Durkheim failed, they say, to understand that bonds of interdependence 
and integration can also be problematic. Interdependencies both at the national and inter-
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Elias’s central argument is that as chains of interdependence lengthen and 
become more complex, groups become more functionally interdependent: 
dependent upon one another, not mutually dependent, but interdependent, often 
in asymmetrical ways and modalities. Such interdependencies can, over time, 
contribute to a relative evening-up in the balance of power between groups. 
However, rather than marking a progressive march towards increasing social 
harmony and emancipation, this process (referred to as functional democratisa-
tion by Elias) typically engenders an increase in the prospects for conflict and 
violence as certain groups gain status at the expense of others. Elias (2008, 
136) used the term “integration conflicts” (see also Wouters 2007, 196; 2019; 
Mennell 2007, 214-47; and Linklater 2016, 420) to describe the social and 
political conflicts that occur as people are drawn into these more complex webs 
of interconnectedness. As human groups become more closely integrated, then 
once relatively independent groups become more entwined with others within 
webs of increasingly complex interdependence, and in which these different 
groups constrain one another in various ways. As suggested, this change in 
interdependence can contribute to one or more groups in this integration pro-
cess losing functions and status, or feeling threatened by such a loss. Invaria-
bly, such groups often struggle against their reduction (or perceived reduction) 
in power potential as they are drawn into larger human groups.  
The processes associated with Brexit, especially the processes of integration 
in Europe (and globally), have contributed to the generation of such integration 
conflicts. That is, if we take a very long-term perspective we can see that hu-
man groups, on the balance, are becoming more integrated and more densely 
interwoven with one another, but that this process almost never goes without 
conflict and resistance. To give examples of this, integration conflicts are ap-
parent when formerly outsider groups gain in power potential, including the 
former European colonies (and their descendants) in relation to their former 
European colonisers, women in relation to men, and homosexuals in relation to 
heterosexuals. In other words, these integration processes are very much tied 
up with the emancipation of former “outsider” groups.  
Elias (2010, 189) used the term “drag effect” to refer to the process de-
scribed above, in which “national habitus” lags behind the “dynamic of un-
planned social processes” of increasingly longer and more complex chains of 
interdependence and integration. It is this drag effect that has and is acting as a 
brake on the formation of a strong European identity. How such drag effects 
influence integration processes is dependent on the force of the social shift and 
the “deep-rootedness” and “resistance of the social habitus.” As part of these 
processes of integration, there is a constant friction between the dynamics of 
social processes and the “more or less radical restructuring of this habitus” 
                                                                                                                                
national levels, including those associated with Brexit and nationalism, are conducive to 
conflict and antagonisms. 
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versus the social habitus of individuals successfully opposing these social dy-
namics, and potentially blocking higher levels of integration.  
In other words, these opposing dynamics are in constant flux in relation to 
different planes of integration. For example, there are integration tensions 
between the constituent countries in the United Kingdom, which was highlight-
ed by the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 when nearly 45% of Scot-
tish voters voted in favour of leaving the UK. There are similar examples 
across Europe and the rest of the world
4
. In this respect, there are disintegrative 
pressures within the United Kingdom as part of attempts to establish greater 
prominence for the Scottish national identity. None of these processes are new 
in Europe, and are apparent in the unevenness in the development of people’s 
social habitus. That is, there are those whose habitus and identity is more se-
curely fixed on the nation state as a level of integration than others who are 
adapting to new levels of integration at the supra-national level. It is perhaps 
not a step too far to suggest that groups that are able to obtain status and mean-
ing at higher levels of integration are less likely to be a “drag” on integration 
processes, whereas those who feel they will lose status or do actually lose sta-
tus as part of integration processes are more likely to cling onto habitus and 
identity associated with lower levels of integration. It is the positioning of each 
individual within these complex webs of interdependence that is central to 
contributing to whether or not they will or will not be a “drag” on integration 
processes. Such a position is not necessarily determined by class, gender, or 
ethnicity, but rather the shifting balances of power with the complex nexus of 
interdependence, and whether individuals fear their group’s status, culture, and 
identity is under threat.  
It is important, in this connection, to distinguish between the role of “fears” 
and “dangers.” While actual “dangers” in the form of threats to the status, 
traditions, and ways of life of particular social groups presented by particular 
social processes – continued membership of the EU, successive waves of im-
migration, increasing social and cultural integration, etc. – may be partly or 
even wholly imaginary, the rising and falling levels of “fear” surrounding such 
perceived threats nonetheless play a decisive role. A notable characteristic of 
the campaign surrounding Brexit was the tendency to transmute fears into 
dangers and vice versa. It is noteworthy that both sides of the Brexit debate 
quite consciously recognised the affective character of divisions in opinion. 
Indeed, a key tactic of the “Leave” campaign was to recast any commentary or 
diagnosis of the likely detrimental consequences, the possible “dangers,” of 
Britain’s departure from the European Union as part of “Project Fear.” Nigel 
Farage, the former leader of UKIP and a principal advocate of Brexit, for ex-
ample, famously dismissed the British Medical Association’s projection that 
                                                             
4
  These examples include Spain, Belgium, the United States, and especially in relation new 
nation states that were once the subject of colonial rule. 
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Brexit would, amongst other consequences, disrupt the pharmaceutical supply 
chain leading to significant delays in the diagnosis and treatment of cancer, and 
affecting the ongoing treatment of over a million patients in the UK as “the 
most extreme form of Project Fear yet” adding that “these people” (British 
doctors) are “an absolute disgrace” (The Guardian, 21 August 2018)
5
. It was 
also Farage who, at the height of the Leave campaign in 2016, stood in front of 
an anti-immigration poster which employed imagery depicting a long curling 
queue of predominantly young, male, non-white refugees over which was 
printed the slogan: “Breaking Point: The EU has failed us all.” The Remain 
campaign were quick to highlight how the poster played on the basest of fears 
about British people becoming “swamped” by predominantly middle-eastern 
(and, through Farage’s subsequent inferences, Moslem) migrants, and how it 
was redolent of imagery employed in Nazi propaganda in the 1930s. Farage 
later claimed that it was this poster that proved to be decisive to the successful 
vote to Leave the EU. In the speech he gave at the unveiling of the “Breaking 
Point” poster, Farage claimed the picture was taken shortly after the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s call the previous summer to European nations to 
ameliorate the humanitarian crisis in Syria (the actual photograph used was 
from 2015 and was of migrants crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border), and went 
so far as to say  
as you can see from this picture, most of the people coming are young males 
and, yes, they may be coming from countries that are not in a very happy 
state, they may be coming from places that are poorer than us, but the EU has 
made a fundamental error that risks the security of everybody. (The Guardian 
16 June 2016, emphasis added)  
Viewers could, of course, also see that almost all of those depicted were non-
white. Farage went on to draw links between the imagery behind him and the 
then recent “Dusseldorf bomb plot” and former terrorist attacks in Paris and 
Brussels. Within the span of a few sentences, and through the employ of some 
carefully selected imagery, Farage had successfully conveyed the impression 
that all migration to Europe was the migration of non-whites, and was, moreo-
ver, the migration of potential terrorists to European soil, threatening the secu-
rity of “everybody.” In doing so, he effectively conflated fears about terrorism, 
about unchecked immigration, about “other” ethnicities, and, of course, about 
people “over there” (Merkel, etc.) making decisions over which “we” have no 
control, but which nonetheless profoundly affect “us” “over here,” converging 
                                                             
5
  At the time of writing (2019), exactly the same charge was made by the Brexiteer Jacob 
Rees Mogg when confronted with a consultant neurologist who was personally involved in 
drafting “Operation Yellowhammer” – the contingency plans for a no deal Brexit, who him-
self suggested that the provisions contained therein would be insufficient to protect pa-
tients. 
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them to the single focal point of Britain’s membership of the EU, and rendering 
such fears as an imminent “danger” to national security.  
3. Functional Democratisation and the Development of 
Nationalist and Egalitarian Normative Codes 
The origins of the duality of normative codes that, we have argued, helps partly 
explain the success of the tactics adopted by Farage and other Leave campaign-
ers has, as we have suggested, a much longer-term sociogenesis. Elias (2008, 
111) traces the processes in Europe of the 11th and 12th centuries by which 
many small and loosely integrated dynastic states, came through both integra-
tion and disintegration “spurts” to expand and become more densely integrated 
in the form of larger dynastic states, and most recently in the form of highly 
integrated nation states. Crucially, it was not, suggests Elias, until this later 
stage that nationalism and national identity came to take hold across the span of 
social strata in European societies. This developmental approach involves the 
notion of different planes of integration and a “filo pastry” (see Mennell in this 
HSR Special Issue) idea of habitus and identity. It helps to expose the myth 
promulgated by some nationalists (and social scientists) that national identity is 
seemingly eternal. Accordingly, English or British national identity is histori-
cally speaking relatively new. This development, as suggested above, involves 
changes in interdependence, in which once relatively disparate groups become 
more functionally interdependent. Elias suggests the following: 
Societies assume the characteristics of nations if the functional interdepend-
ence between their regions and their social strata as well as their hierarchic 
levels of authority and subordination become sufficiently great and sufficient-
ly reciprocal for none of them to be able to disregard completely what the oth-
ers think, feel or wish. (2008, 117) 
This process of functional democratisation is in part driven by competition 
between ruling elites, who became more dependent on lower social strata in the 
context of inter-state tensions. One of the dominant processes of nation-state 
formation in Europe in the 19th century involved middle class groups gaining 
in power potential relative to the formerly dominant elites, predominantly the 
aristocracy (and gentry in England). This process was central to changing the 
institutions and dominant codes of behaviour in British (as well as in other 
European) society/ies, which increasingly began “to reflect bourgeois interests 
and bourgeois values” (Dunning and Sheard 2005, 61). The shift towards bour-
geois codes, suggests Elias (2013, 57-158), involved a change in identification 
by ruling groups with those in the same social class in Europe (which was the 
dominant form of identification among Europe’s aristocracy) to identification 
with people in one’s own emerging nation-state. Identification shifted to na-
tional symbols from identification with individuals. Later this change incorpo-
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rated the industrial working classes, as ruling elites became more functionally 
dependent upon them, and integrated them into the developing nationalist 
codes. However, the shift in dominant codes from aristocratic codes to bour-
geois codes, did not involve a complete eclipse of the former, but rather a mix-
ing of various levels of dilution of these codes depending on the specific fig-
urational dynamics of each emergent nation-state. 
Accordingly, Elias (2013, 155-7) suggests that these emergent national iden-
tities and habitudes
6
 involved blends of these different codes. These, however, 
differed from one European state to another based on the emergent but differ-
ing structures of interdependence in each nation state. Elias points out that 
when the middle classes rose in power potential to become part of the ruling 
elites, they brought with them traditions associated with egalitarian and human-
ist codes which had a greater focus on human beings beyond the confines of the 
emergent nation states. This is evident in Kant’s assertion that as human groups 
become more interconnected, a unique human capacity for cooperation over 
large areas develops, which seeks to make human suffering a moral problem 
for the whole world (Kant cited in Linklater 2010, 156). It is also apparent in 
Elias’s examination of the sociogenesis of the concept of civilisation in France, 
which during the late 17th and early 18th centuries came to express the national 
self-image of France, following the French Revolution and the rise to ruling 
positions by the bourgeoisie (see Elias 2012, 55-7). 
Middle class elites, in the context of inter-state relations, were constrained in 
their ability to apply egalitarian humanist codes because of the specifics of 
inter-state competition and had to draw on the Machiavellian princely codes of 
the former ruling elites. By contrast, this code, suggests Elias, involved: 
the pursuit of unrestrained self-interest as the leading principle of conduct, 
checked only by the fear of the greater power or the greater skill of potential 
opponents, which had dominated the politics of the leading dynasties and the 
leading aristocratic groups of different states in their relations with each other; 
[and] had left a heritage of mutual fears and suspicions in inter-state relations. 
(2013, 155-6) 
The unrestrained self-interest on the inter-state plane, and the Machiavellian 
code from which it is derived, can be traced to the warrior codes of conduct 
that Elias discusses in On the Process of Civilisation. Elias (2012, 190) sets out 
how warriors, although increasingly restrained in their actions as the centuries 
unfolded, from the 9th to the 15th century lived for and loved battle. This, says 
Elias, was their only function. During the Middle Ages, the willingness and joy 
in fighting was a necessity for almost all people including the warrior class of 
knights and the burghers in the towns. “The structure and tensions of this socie-
ty made this an inescapable condition for individuals” (Elias 2012, 192). In 
                                                             
6  We have adopted the term “habitudes” to refer to habitus in the plural. We have done so in 
favour of the rather inelegant habituses.  
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more recent times, it is the structure and tensions between states that has con-
tributed to a set of international relations based more on the Machiavellian 
pursuit of self-interest than on egalitarian codes. And it is in this context in 
which hostility to outsiders – that is, those who do not share an “accepted” 
form of national identity – is generated. 
During the 18th and 19th centuries, the period in which nation states were 
forming, the dualistic normative code developed further. This, as Linklater 
(2016, 77) suggests, is one of the “basic features of the social habitus of citi-
zens of ‘civilised’ nation states”. Similarly, Elias contends that the duality of 
normative codes is a defining feature of 20th (and by extension 21st) century 
nation states. It is the tensions within this dualistic code and a rising of fears 
that in recent years in Europe and the United States have contributed to a shift 
towards nationalism and a Machiavellian self-interest as opposed to the more 
egalitarian humanist code. It is the tensions inherent in this dualistic code that 
have been recognised in the works of Delanty, Crouch, Calhoun, and Ford and 
Goodwin, when they talk of dichotomies or cleavages between cosmopolitan-
ism and exclusionary nationalism. But as we have suggested, their work fails to 
locate these cleavages as part of long-term social processes that are closely 
related to the formation of nation states and national identities, as Elias has 
done.  
Instead the ascendance of the middle classes to ruling positions in 19th cen-
tury Europe involved changes in identification, and changes in the patterns of 
“we-and-they-feelings” (Elias 2013, 158). As they came to replace aristocratic 
elites, these changes in identification among the new ruling middle class elites, 
on balance, became stronger towards their compatriots, and weaker towards 
people of the same social standing in other countries. The opposite had been 
the case in an earlier period when aristocratic elites identified more closely 
with elites in other European societies. This change in identification, says Elias, 
was central to the development of nationalist sentiment, first among the middle 
classes in Europe and later the working classes. This involved a shift from the 
personal power politics of princes to an impersonal power politics of nations. 
But there was a continuity of the Machiavellian pursuit of self-interest from 
firstly aristocratic elites and later by nations. One of the consequences of this 
shift in identification, says Elias (2013, 159), was people began to form emo-
tional bonds and symbolic attachments to the nation, rather than just to individ-
uals, as was the case when princes were at the centre of power relations. Verbal 
symbols tended to hold the most special role, he says, and worked as a focal 
point for individuals to bond to the collectivity. This collectivity became en-
dowed with special qualities not dissimilar to those given to gods, and the 
names of nation states came to be used with “overtones of sanctity and awe” 
(2013, 160). This deifying of national symbols is clear today. For example, the 
UK’s former prime minister, Theresa May, announced during her premiership a 
“Festival of Great Britain” to strengthen “our precious union,” to “showcase 
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what makes our country great today” (Devenport 2018). The same can be seen 
elsewhere. For example, in a speech to the United Nations, American president, 
Donald Trump stated that: “America will always act in our national interest 
[…] America is governed by Americans. We reject the ideology of globalism, 
and we embrace the doctrine of patriotism” (Ward, 2018).  
The development of dualistic national codes, as suggested above, has not in 
recent years simply manifested in two opposing groups tying themselves to 
either the mast of nationalism or the mast of cosmopolitanism (the “dartboard” 
model versus “figurational” model of nationalism). The habitudes of different 
individuals involve various blends of the dualistic code and related behavioural 
standards with one aspect of the code tending to dominate over the other. The 
blends, in certain respects, tend to be relative to the specific processes of na-
tion-state formation in each individual state, and the dynamics of integration 
and civilising processes that each state has been through and continues to go 
through. To oversimplify, a state may at any particular historical juncture be 
dominated by people for whom the dartboard model of nationalism dominates 
or the cosmopolitan model dominates. In the United Kingdom, the develop-
ment of particular national habitudes have most recently contributed to the near 
even split between “Remainers” and “Leavers” over the UK’s relationship with 
the EU. An important point to make here is that this split does not follow the 
somewhat simplistic notion of a “left behind” white working class, or middle 
class southerners, or indeed a rump of anti-immigrant racists as being central to 
the Brexit vote. The problem is much more opaque, and involves a far more 
complex interplay of relational ties. That is, we-groups overlap within and 
between nation states, they are interdependent with one another, as part of a 
complex web in which shifting power dynamics are integral to the development 
of habitudes and identities, and have played a role in some seemingly disparate 
groups wanting to “Leave” the EU. It is the apparent “unrelatedness” of the 
different groups that voted for Brexit that helps to demonstrate this overlap and 
intermeshing of we-groups and identities, which for example might include a 
well-educated middle class, middle-aged British South Asian woman from 
London voting in favour of Brexit, or a white working class twenty-something 
man from Bradford doing the same. Demographically they appear to share little 
in common. Indeed, pace Bhambra, analysis of Brexit voting data by the BBC 
has suggested that a high number of educated British South Asians from Lon-
don voted to leave the EU (BBC 2017). This is despite a pattern that suggests 
low educational attainment was the single most significant contributor to voting 
to leave. However, this trend is not borne out when ethnicity is taken into ac-
count. Counter to the idea of low education as central to vote Leave is evidence 
that areas with poorly educated people, but with a high BAME population, 
tended to vote remain. Even the contention that BAME populations voted Re-
main is problematic, with the BBC analysis suggesting that a third of British 
Asians voted leave, compared to roughly a quarter of black African and Carib-
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bean, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi; whereas in some London wards with high 
BAME concentrations, a majority voted to Leave (BBC 2017). 
This complexity – the wide and varying reasons for why different groups 
voted to leave or remain – is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in keep-
ing with the discussion so far, we are able to focus on the specific development 
of British normative codes and civilising processes that have been significant in 
this respect, and may begin to shed some light onto the problem. Accordingly, 
an important aspect in the development of the British national habitus came 
about through the development of the British Parliament or what Elias and 
Dunning (2008) referred to as “Parliamentarisation,” which involved a shift 
towards non-violent conflict in Britain in the 18th century between the two 
major landowning groups, represented in the legislature as the Whigs and the 
Tories. The competing political groups (who, compared to their French coun-
terparts, had much greater power potential in relation to the monarch) shifted 
from engaging in violent conflict with one another to non-violent forms, in 
what Elias refers to as a “civilising spurt.” This change was “reflected in the 
social habitus of individuals,” and played a major part in the “development of 
English society” (Elias and Dunning 2008, 17-8). A sense of compromise and 
the skill of persuasion were central to conflicts, rather than violence, and be-
came central to “social survival” (Elias and Dunning 2008, 20).  
As the industrial revolution in the United Kingdom gathered pace from 
around 1830, the balance of power began shifting in favour of the industrial 
bourgeoisie – a process Dunning and Sheard (2005, 60) have referred to as 
embourgeoisement. This process involved an integration of landowners and 
bourgeoisie, who became more functionally interdependent with one another, 
with neither group (over the short-term) becoming totally dominant. However, 
since much of the power chances of the bourgeoisie lay in industrial produc-
tion, over the longer-term this group tended to dominate, while the land-
owning classes had to adapt to these new dynamics (Dunning and Sheard 2005, 
61). As processes of functional democratisation developed and different groups 
within the United Kingdom became more functionally interdependent, domi-
nant social codes became diffused into wider sections of British society. This 
included, in the 19th century, the integration of landed elites with bourgeois 
elites, which resulted in the specific blend of manners (from the upper classes) 
and morals (from the middle classes) (Elias 1994a, 506; Fletcher 1997, 94). 
Between the mid-19th and mid-20th century, a broader range of groups, but 
principally members of the industrial working classes, were drawn into the 
orbit of an emergent British national habitus and identity, which involved 
blends of the dualistic normative code, and specifically British habitudes based 
on a mixing of social codes. Those codes relating to conflict resolution and 
pacification, in turn, involving the development of more even emotional con-
trols (Elias 2012, 412). What are often regarded as distinctly British codes and 
civilisational behavioural standards include the concept of fair play, decency, 
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humility, the rule of law, gentlemanly conduct, pragmatism, and so on. Com-
bined with Britain’s status in the second half of the 19th century and early 20th 
century as the world’s largest empire, these behavioural standards combined 
with a belief among the British (and some of their colonial subjects) that they 
were civilising the rest of the world by spreading the rule of law, democracy, 
modernising “backward” parts of the world, and giving the rest of the world 
modern sport. 
More recently, social codes and behavioural standards have continued to 
combine and develop. For example, other social groups, including those who 
have immigrated to the United Kingdom over the course of the past century 
have contributed to and taken on aspects of British habitudes. What this means 
in terms of the development of British habitudes is that as contrasts in conduct 
between different groups in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) diminishes, 
in the context of increasing functional interdependence, then varieties of con-
duct, habitudes, and identities increase (see Elias 2012, 426). Therefore, such 
variety can help to account for the complexity and diversity of the Leave vote. 
For example, this may help us to explain why there was a high South Asian 
Leave vote in London. Accordingly, the diversity of different groups take on 
different shades of European dualistic normative codes, which have a specific 
national nuance, in the case of the United Kingdom, associated with the pacifi-
cation of the landed classes and a specific mixing of middle class and upper 
class, which was further developed through an increase in the functional inter-
dependence between these higher status groups, the working classes, immi-
grants, and so on. 
With regard to Brexit, the peculiarities of the British case are such that they 
do not, as we proposed earlier in this paper, involve a straightforward divide 
between those who adopt British, nationalist, normative codes, on the one 
hand, and on the other, those who are oriented towards more cosmopolitan 
European codes. Indeed, on both sides of the debate, and across the political 
spectrum, the stamp of enduring we-images, of distinctively British civilisa-
tional codes, is apparent in the debates playing out over conventional and digi-
tal media. An exemplar in this respect is a post by a London-based copyeditor, 
an opponent of Brexit, and a left-leading writer, whose answer to the question 
of “Why do some British people not like Donald Trump” became, within a few 
hours of its drafting, extensively shared and disseminated over social media. 
Nate White’s response is worth quoting at length: 
A few things spring to mind. Trump lacks certain qualities which the British 
traditionally esteem. For instance, he has no class, no charm, no coolness, no 
credibility, no compassion, no wit, no warmth, no wisdom, no subtlety, no 
sensitivity, no self-awareness, no humility, no honour and no grace – all quali-
ties, funnily enough, with which his predecessor Mr. Obama was generously 
blessed. So for us, the stark contrast does rather throw Trump’s limitations in-
to embarrassingly sharp relief. 
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Plus, we like a laugh. And while Trump may be laughable, he has never once 
said anything wry, witty or even faintly amusing – not once, ever. I don’t say 
that rhetorically, I mean it quite literally: not once, not ever. And that fact is 
particularly disturbing to the British sensibility – for us, to lack humour is al-
most inhuman. But with Trump, it’s a fact. He doesn’t even seem to under-
stand what a joke is – his idea of a joke is a crass comment, an illiterate insult, 
a casual act of cruelty […]. There is never any under-layer of irony, complexi-
ty, nuance or depth. It’s all surface […] 
And worse, he is that most unforgivable of all things to the British: a bully. 
That is, except when he is among bullies; then he suddenly transforms into a 
snivelling sidekick instead. There are unspoken rules to this stuff – the 
Queensberry rules of basic decency – and he breaks them all. He punches 
downwards – which a gentleman should, would, could never do – and every 
blow he aims is below the belt. He particularly likes to kick the vulnerable or 
voiceless – and he kicks them when they are down […]. (White 2019)  
White’s response reads like a checklist of British civilisational codes: coolness, 
self-awareness, humility, wit and humour, fair play, decency, and so forth. The 
mention of “Queensbury Rules” (the rules developed around Boxing originally 
developed in the 19th century) is particularly noteworthy: the rules are a more 
general (and generally accepted) metaphor for the rules of acceptable, polite, 
“civilised” behaviour. The post, somewhat inadvertently, is expressive of an 
enduring British sense of civilisational superiority with regard to understanding 
such norms, and of looking down upon those (“embarrassingly” brash, vulgar 
Americans, not just Trump) who neither understand nor adhere to them. Most 
significant is that this sense of superiority is shared, to varying degrees, across 
the political spectrum, and in both sides of the debate surrounding Brexit. On 
the one side, as is the case in White’s response, such normative codes have 
been channelled towards a sense of “fair play,” towards the “vulnerable or 
voiceless”; on the other, the interpretation is more one of needing to separate 
those who do not share “our” values from “us,” and also the need to separate 
“us” from “them.” For those now wishing to leave Europe, this superiority was 
perhaps once rather more reconcilable with the idea of Britain’s membership of 
the European Union, but only to the extent that Britain could understand itself 
to be adopting a kind of paternalistic role, effectively working to “civilise” 
other European nations – a stance adopted by Thatcher in the 1980s in her often 
condescending orientation towards European partner states (Parekh 2018). As 
we have suggested above, such a sense of superiority can be understood to be 
founded in part on the early parliamentarisation and industrialisation of Britain 
and its once considerable global empire – and in this respect, its self-
understanding of having provided tutelage to other parts of the world about 
democracy, technology, civilisation, plus, through its role in the Second World 
War, of having prevented Europe from falling under the dominance of a single 
power (Parekh 2018).  
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Somewhat paradoxically, Britain did indeed previously belong to a much 
larger survival unit than it did today – its former empire, the remnants of which 
persist in the form of the Commonwealth. This lineage appears to be particular-
ly significant: it is not so much that those oppose Europe, who advocate Brexit, 
are opposed to belonging to a larger survival unit, but rather, it is the sense of 
belonging to a survival unit in which the balance of interdependencies has 
shifted such that it, Britain, is no longer the centre, the key player, the dominant 
moral, political, and normative authority. That, it would seem, is decisively 
unpalatable; that is understood to be the basis for British capitulation and the 
undoing of centuries of history. Indeed, before he became the UK’s (Brexiteer) 
Prime Minister, Boris Johnson (then a backbencher) said in 2018 of the Cheq-
uers Agreement (a White Paper outlining the UK’s withdrawal plans) whose 
development was led by his predecessor, Theresa May, that such plans consti-
tuted a “humiliation for the country,” a missed opportunity to reclaim the dy-
namism of Britain’s golden past, “to use every ounce of Britain’s power, hard 
and soft, to go back out into the world in a way that we had perhaps forgotten 
over the past 45 years: to find friends, to open markets, to promote our culture 
and our values” (Johnson 2018).
7
 
Accordingly, nationalist views of Europe have shifted away from the notion 
of an adventure in which Britain could understand itself as being in Europe, but 
not of it – an idea sustainable to the extent that the recognition of Britain’s 
distinctiveness, its superiority, by other member states could be taken for 
granted (and the benefits of its membership could be reaped). Here, Britain 
could imagine itself as serving as a model for others to follow, to be continuing 
to “bail out” Europe, to prevent other nations from collapsing. In populist im-
aginaries, such a notion has come gradually to be replaced by one in which 
Europe is understood as a kind of federalist plot, a Franco-Saxon alliance that 
has continued the unfinished agenda of the Second World War (Parekh 2018). 
These different interpretations, as we have argued, have been present even 
before Britain’s original joining of the EEC many decades ago, however, cru-
cially, at that time, its victory in the Second World War was still a relatively 
recent memory, and the empire, while greatly depleted, still substantial. Its 
subsequent demise on the global stage, the further decline of its empire, its 
eclipse by the ascendancy of the US, China, and Russia as global powers, have, 
again paradoxically, weakened not strengthened its will to integrate with Eu-
rope; here again the enduring sense of decline, of post-colonial impotence, of 
                                                             
7
  Here, we might contrast the development of British collective symbolisations, representa-
tions, and orientations towards Europe with those of Spain. As Jáuregui (2001) proposes, 
“while in Britain the idea of ‘Europe’ became widely associated with a decline of national 
status after the loss of ‘world power,’ in Spain, on the contrary, this concept symbolized a 
crucial enhancement of national prestige following the collapse of a ‘backward dictator-
ship.’” 
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growing insignificance, of nostalgia for a once glorious past, appear to have 
played a particularly decisive role. 
3.1  Brexit and Nationalism as Part Processes of Functional 
Democratisation  
As we have argued, nationalist creeds developed in the course of competition 
between nation states, including the need for nation states to defend themselves 
against one another. Following Elias, we can understand how the competition 
and mutual suspicions inherited from the Machiavellian code of princes and the 
groundswell of nationalism in 19th century Europe were major contributors to 
the two world wars during the first half of the 20th century. The weakened 
national pride among many European countries, following the Second World 
War, together with a structural realignment of international relations based on 
the antagonisms between the Soviet Union and the United States, and a reduc-
tion in power potential among European states, contributed to a shift in the 
balance in the dualistic normative code in Europe towards greater egalitarian-
ism relative to militaristic nationalist codes and narrower spans of emotional 
identification. This manifested in the shifting political structures in Europe in a 
centrifugal direction, and a lengthening and greater interweaving of interde-
pendency chains contributing to the formation of the EEC and later the EU. 
That balance in the dualistic normative codes fluctuated in recent years, with 
nationalist we-feelings again gaining ground. The ascendance of egalitarian and 
humanist codes following the world wars as part of a “civilising spurt” that 
involved processes of functional democratisation, integration, and a flourishing 
of emancipatory movements relating to members of working classes, women, 
members of former European colonies, etc. But the unevenness of integration 
and emancipation processes and the shifts in power balances that they entail 
contributed to other groups fearing a loss of status. As in the 19th century, 
these processes of functional democratisation involved a loss of power poten-
tial for certain elites and at times other groups, including those that had in-
creased their power chances previously. In particular, some working class 
groups that since the beginning of the 19th century had been among a selection 
of rising strata, began to lose power potential and were being less integrated 
into a society dominated by “values of the ‘hegemonic’ upper and middle clas-
ses” (Dunning, Murphy, and Williams 1988, 120). It is this disintegrative pres-
sure that some of the theorists mention at the beginning of this article that re-
lates to the idea of a “left behind” group of people. 
In the context of the losses and fears that groups have experienced in the 
face of integration, functional democratisation and lengthening chains of inter-
dependence, in the United Kingdom, Europe, and the United States fearful that 
elite groups (Brexiteers and sections of the Republican Party, for example) 
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have been able to appeal to nationalist sentiments and loyalties of wider sec-
tions of society in order to foster their own sectional interests. Accordingly: 
Nationalist belief and value systems in highly developed countries with rela-
tively high standards of living are usually backward looking creeds. They are 
used in societies of this type with the aim of preserving the established order, 
even if the social movement rallied in the name of the national heritage and its 
virtues in fact aims at overthrowing the existing order. If that is done, it is 
usually in the name of the restoration of the past, of the unchanging heritage 
of the nation. (Elias 2013, 163) 
We can see these processes unfolding in both the United Kingdom and the 
United States. For example a small section of the elite in the UK, including 
prominent right-wing politicians like Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and former 
UKIP leader Nigel Farage, as the examples above show, have used nationalist 
sentiment and the idea of national heritage to garner support to leave the EU 
among larger sections of the UK population. They have, at least in the short-
term, been able to significantly disrupt the existing order which had a consen-
sus across political parties for remaining in the EU. The process is not dissimi-
lar in the United States. Donald Trump’s administration has used American 
nationalism to appeal to a core of constituents, who portrayed themselves as 
“overthrowing” a liberal elite embodied by Hilary Clinton – a woman, a Dem-
ocrat, and, as they depicted it, a member of the political “establishment.” This 
is not to say that the Brexiteers and Donald Trump’s circle have harnessed 
nationalism simply to gain power, although there are elements of this. Instead, 
they have enjoyed considerable success in invoking the nationalist rhetoric of a 
restoration of a lost golden past, and the ideals embedded in the ideas of na-
tionhood, and to help foster the collective fear that these are being “lost” as 
processes of global integration and functional democratisation threaten the 
status, identity, the means of orientation of “true” (and here, specific notions of 
indigeneity and authenticity are pivotal) Americans, or “The British People.” 
The arguments about a loss of status made by Winlow, Hall, and Treadwell, 
Ford and Goodwin, and Treadwell and Fukuyama, therefore, have some 
weight. Although, as has been suggested above, this loss of status is related to 
longer-term trends of global integration and functional democratisation, rather 
than simply political policies, failures of the left, or economics.  
4.  Conclusion 
To conclude, it is important to be clear that the research cited at the beginning 
of this paper is understood to be supplemented rather more than negated by the 
analysis we have presented. Taken by itself, the left behind thesis, for example, 
leads to the belief that groups who have lost status are voting against the status 
quo. However, a longer-term sociogenetic approach to this aspect of Brexit and 
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nationalism suggests to us that the “left behind” have lost status as part of pro-
cesses of functional democratisation and related global integration processes, 
much more complex and long-term social processes than have been suggested 
in the literature on Brexit so far. Without an appreciation of such longer-term 
developments, such analyses face the danger of playing into the hands of those 
who, for political gain, wish to identify singular “causes” or assign historical 
blame. Relatedly, approaches that have identified cleavages in Britain and other 
Western nations have identified axial tensions and divides that do not in any 
simple ways follow standard logics of social distribution (based, say, around 
social class or political orientation). However, such approaches have arguably 
not done enough to identify the longer-term developments of which such 
cleavages form part. Through the employ of Elias’s approach, we have sug-
gested that these developments are in fact related very closely to the formation 
of national identities, which have come about through processes of functional 
democratisation and integration, and accordingly, are likely to endure irrespec-
tive of the full course of the Brexit political process. 
We have argued that a figurational approach also helps to show a more reali-
ty congruent picture of the relational dynamics between the United Kingdom 
and the rest of Europe. That is despite the Brexit vote, the United Kingdom will 
continue to be tied to the EU in a highly complex web of interdependencies. 
What people have actually voted for, was not to leave the EU in any tangible 
sense of becoming independent, or “taking back control,” even though they 
may have thought that is what they were doing. The actual change will be a 
reconfiguration of the United Kingdom’s already dynamic and fluctuating 
interdependencies with the European Union and other parts of the world. It is a 
change in the structure of relations. It is perhaps appropriate, therefore, to 
speculate that those changes will be concerned with the power potential of the 
United Kingdom, the European Union, and other countries around the world. 
Accordingly, it may well be the case that leaving the EU may contribute to a 
loss of power potential for the United Kingdom relative to other European 
countries and other countries around the world. Speculation in the British press 
over a post-Brexit trade deal with the United States is already suggesting that 
the United Kingdom will be at a significant disadvantage in negotiations. That 
is, by seeking to act alone, rather than as part of a more integrated and interde-
pendent whole, in the form of the EU, the United Kingdom has less potential to 
influence other states in the crucible of inter-state relations – there may well be 
something in Barrack Obama’s threat about the United Kingdom moving to the 
back of the queue when it comes to trade deals. The fantasy image of a bucca-
neering Britain leading the “Anglosphere” and the countries from its former 
empire is just that – a fantasy, and one that involves, for some, identifying with 
an idealised lost golden past. The following quote from Elias helps to capture 
this position: 
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A striking example of our time is that of the we-image and we-ideal of once-
powerful nations whose superiority in relation to others has declined. Their 
members may suffer for centuries because the group charismatic we-ideal, 
modelled on an idealized image of themselves in the days of their greatness, 
lingers on for many generations as a model they feel they ought to live up to, 
without being able to do so. The radiance of their collective life as a nation 
has gone; their power superiority in relation to other groups, emotionally un-
derstood as a sign of their own higher human value in relation to the inferior 
value of these others, is irretrievably lost. Yet the dream of their special cha-
risma is kept alive in a variety of ways […]. But the discrepancy between the 
actual and the imagined position of one’s group among others can also entail a 
mistaken assessment of one’s power resources and, as a consequence, suggest 
a group strategy in pursuit of a fantasy image of one’s own greatness that may 
lead to self-destruction as well as to destruction of other interdependent 
groups. The dreams of nations (as of other groups) are dangerous. An overde-
veloped we-ideal is a sign of a collective illness. (2008, 28-9)  
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